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Abstract
As illustrated by the famous Ellsberg paradox, many subjects prefer
to bet on events with known rather than with unknown probabilities,
i.e., they are ambiguity averse. In an experiment, we examine subjects’
choices when there is an additional source of ambiguity, namely, when
they do not know how much money they can win. Using a standard
independence assumption, we show that ambiguity averse subjects
should continue to strictly prefer the urn with known probabilities.
In contrast, our results show that many subjects no longer exhibit
such a strict preference. This should have important ramifications for
modeling ambiguity aversion.
Keywords: ambiguity aversion, uncertainty, minmax-expected util-
ity
JEL-Classifications: C91, D81.
∗We thank Adam Dominiak, Peter Dürsch, Paolo Ghirardato, Yoram Halevy, Jean-
Philippe Lefort, Christoph Vanberg, Peter Wakker, and participants of the D-TEA work-
shop in Paris 2011 for spirited discussions and many useful comments.
†Email: juergen.eichberger@awi.uni-heidelberg.de
‡Email: oechssler@uni-hd.de
§Email: wendelin.schnedler@wiwi.upb.de
1 Introduction
In Ellsberg’s famous two—color experiment (1961), subjects can choose be-
tween placing bets on the color of a ball drawn from one of two urns. The
first urn (urn H ) contains a number of colored balls, half of which are known
to be black and half of which are known to be red. The second urn (urn U )
contains balls of the same colors but in unknown proportions. Subjects who
irrespectively of the color strictly prefer betting on the urn where half of the
balls are black are classified as ambiguity-averse.
In the classic experiment, ambiguity only concerns the composition of the
urns. In reality, however, ambiguity is rarely limited to a specific aspect of a
situation. In particular, the gains from winning are often not clear.1 In this
paper, we examine experimentally how ambiguity aversion is aﬀected when
ambiguous situations become more ambiguous in the sense that there is also
uncertainty about the prizes one can win. As we shall see, this has important
consequences for modeling ambiguity aversion.
We extend Ellsberg’s two-color experiment by systematically varying the
information available about the prize. Subjects decide on an urn (H or U )
and a color (black or red). If their color matches that of the ball drawn from
the respective urn, subjects receive an envelope that is marked with an equal
sign (=). If not, they receive a (diﬀerent) envelope that is marked with an
unequal sign (6=).
1For example, lottery stands often do not state the possible prizes when claiming that
“Every second ticket wins!”
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We consider three situations. In situation O (for open envelope), subjects
see the contents of the envelopes. There are 3 euro in the envelope with the =
sign and 1 euro in the other envelope. Situation O corresponds to the usual
Ellsberg experiment. In addition, we consider the following two variations.
In situation S (for sealed envelope), subjects only know that one of the two
envelopes contains 3 euro and the other 1 euro but they do not know which
amount is in which envelope. In situation R (for random), subjects know that
the content of the envelope (3 euro or 1 euro, respectively) will be determined
by flipping a fair coin after they have made their choice on which urn to bet.
Since situation O describes the standard Ellsberg experiment, ambiguity
averse subjects should strictly prefer to bet on the urn with the known com-
position of colors. In situation R, one could follow Raiﬀa (1961) and argue
that decision makers face equal odds of winning the 3 euro no matter which
urn they choose.2
For situation S, one could argue as follows: “Given that I have no way
of knowing what I win if I win, I should not care whether I win.” Given this
line of reasoning (which is actually entertained by at least two of the authors
of this paper), a subject should not care whether he bets on the known or
the unknown urn.
Predicting formally how ambiguity averse subjects behave in situation S
is more involved. Our starting point is to represent ambiguity aversion using
the MaxMin Expected Utility (MEU) approach by Gilboa and Schmeidler
2This argument can be formalized in the Anscombe and Aumann (1963) setting.
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(1989). Later, we also consider alternative approaches and their predictions
like Choquet expected utility (CEU) pioneered by Schmeidler (1989) and the
smooth ambiguity model by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).
Suppose now that subjects believe the envelope’s content to be indepen-
dent from the color of the ball drawn, which can be formalized with the
notion of independence advanced by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989). Given
this notion and the MEU representation, we show that decision makers who
strictly prefer to bet on urn H in situation O would also do so in situation S
but be indiﬀerent in situation R.
Our results are only partially in line with these predictions. As usual in
such experiments, about 2/3 of subjects are ambiguity averse in the sense
that they prefer to bet on urn H in situation O. However, we find that in
situation S, this share drops significantly. The additional ambiguity about the
contents of the envelope seems to mitigate the ambiguity about the contents
of the urn. Finally, few subjects seem to be indiﬀerent between urns in
situation R, although most theories (like SEU or MEU) predict them to be
so. Instead, most subjects still strictly prefer to bet on urn H.
Apart from very mild assumptions on the set of priors, our theoretical
predictions rely decisively on the assumption that this set is a product set of
the set of priors for the urn composition and the envelope’s content. Without
this assumption, subjects who strictly prefer urn H when the envelope’s
content is known, may well cease to do so when it is unknown.
Our paper contributes to a growing literature that examines specific pre-
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dictions of ambiguity models. Superficially, these experiments concern dif-
ferent aspects of ambiguity, for example, its relationship to preferences for
randomization (Dominiak and Schnedler 2011) or that to dynamic consis-
tency (Cohen et al., 2000, Dominiak, Duersch, and Lefort, 2012). However,
all these predictions have in common that they critically depend on how
independence is modeled.
As an example take preferences for randomization. In response to the
Ellsberg paradox, Raiﬀa (1961) advanced the intuitive argument that, by
choosing whether to bet on the color Red or the color Black conditional on
the outcome of a coin flip, an ambiguity-averse decision maker could trans-
form the ambiguous choice into the preferred unambiguous gamble. Eich-
berger and Kelsey (1996b) show that such a preference for randomization
depends on how the random device is modelled. In the Anscombe-Aumann
framework, randomization over acts corresponds to forming a state-wise con-
vex combination of the outcome lotteries. In this case, ambiguity aversion
implies a preference for randomization. If one models the random device ex-
plicitly as part of the state space, however, then no such implication follows.
Indeed, as Klibanoﬀ (2001) shows, one needs specific behavioral assumptions
in order to model behavior corresponding to the notion of an independent
random device and, in consequence, a clear preference for randomization.
Schmeidler’s (1989) ambiguity aversion axiom, which underpins various rep-
resentations of ambiguity averse behavior, directly stipulates preferences for
randomization. Dominiak and Schnedler (2011) experimentally test whether
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ambiguity averse subjects prefer randomization but find no such relationship.
Indeed, a considerable share of ambiguity averse subjects dislikes random-
ization.3
With respect to dynamic consistency, Eichberger and Kelsey (1996) show
that it is, in general, incompatible with ambiguity aversion in the CEUmodel.
Even if dynamic consistency is restricted to a particular event tree, it implies
additive separability of preferences and, hence, conditional independence of
beliefs up to the final stage. For the multiple prior model, Sarin and Wakker
(1998) show that dynamic consistency of intertemporal choices implies con-
straints on the set of priors if they are updated pointwise according to Bayes’
rule. Epstein and Schneider’s (2003) concept of “rectangularity” character-
izes the condition on the sets of priors which allow for independence. Hansen
et al. (2006) criticize the emphasis given to dynamic consistency and the im-
plied independence in situations of genuine uncertainty. Bade (2008) points
out there is a direct association between the updating rule and how indepen-
dence is defined.
Despite the large number of experiments on ambiguity in general (for a
partial survey see Camerer, 1995, or Halevy, 2007) there is to our knowledge
only one other study that considers an Ellsberg type experiment in which
the size of the prize is also uncertain. Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011) consider
a three—color Ellsberg urn, where in some treatments the amount of money
won depends on the (unknown) number of balls of a given color. Thus, in
3Using a diﬀerent experimental design Spears (2009) comes to a similar conclusion.
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contrast to our setting, the uncertainty with respect to the number of balls of
a given color and with respect to the size of the prize money come from the
same source. Hence, the issue of stochastic independence of diﬀerent sources
of uncertainty can play no role. In fact, due to their design, the probability
of winning is perfectly correlated with the size of the prize, depending on
the treatment either positively or negatively. Eliaz and Ortoleva (2011) find
that most subjects prefer to bet on a color with unknown proportion in the
positively correlated situation. In addition, many subjects prefer a gamble
with positively correlated ambiguity to gambles without any ambiguity.4
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section we
describe the experimental design and procedures. In Section 3, we derive
various theoretical hypotheses. Results are analyzed and discussed in Section
4. In Section 5, we discuss alternative models of ambiguity. Finally, we close
with a brief discussion of the implications of our findings in Section 6.
2 Design of the experiment
Our experiment encompasses three variations on a standard two-urn Ellsberg
setting. There are two urns. Each urn contains 40 balls, which are either
black or red. In the first urn (urn H ) half of the balls are black and the
other half red. The second urn (urn U ) contains an unknown proportion of
4These observations may be rationalized by the fact that a subjective expected utility
maximizer who follows the principle of insuﬃcient reason would actually strictly prefer
betting on a color with unknown proportion given positive correlation.
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20 red
20 black
urn H (half)
? red
? black
urn U (unknown)
40 balls40 balls
Figure 1: Composition of urns used in the experiment
black and red balls.5 Subjects can win the money in one of two envelopes,
one of which is marked with an equal sign (=) and the other marked with an
unequal sign (6=). Subjects have to decide on an urn (U, H, or indiﬀerent)
and a color (black, red, or indiﬀerent). Then, a ball is drawn from the chosen
urn and if the drawn ball has the chosen color, they receive the money in
the envelope marked with = and otherwise that in the envelope marked with
6= (see Figures 1 and 2 for illustrations). If subjects indicate that they are
indiﬀerent, the first option for the respective decision is chosen as payoﬀ
relevant.6
In our experiment, we consider three diﬀerent situations. In each situa-
tion, subjects are informed that one of the envelopes contains 3 euro, while
the other contains 1 euro. The knowledge about which envelope contains
5In the actual experiment, we used bags and blue and green marbles. For expositional
reasons, we employ the more customary urns, balls, and colors in the text.
6Note that strictly speaking indiﬀerent subjects have no strict incentive to mark that
they are indiﬀerent. However, there is evidence that subjects have an aversion to lying, in
particular in situations in which they have no strategic reason for doing so (cf. Gneezy,
2005; Vanberg, 2008; and Hurkens and Kartik, 2009).
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the 3 euro diﬀers across the three situations. In situation O (open), sub-
jects know that the envelope with the = sign contains the 3 euro (and the
other 1 euro). In situation S (sealed), subjects are informed that whether
the envelope with the = sign contains 3 euro or the envelope with the 6=
sign has been determined according to some unknown probability. In sit-
uation R (randomized), subjects know that the envelope, which contains 3
euro, is determined by throwing a fair coin after the experiment; so that the
envelope with the = sign contains the 3 euro with probability one half. Situ-
ation O thus represents a classical Ellsberg-two-color urn experiment, while
situation S introduces additional ambiguity about the envelopes’ contents.
Subject chooses 
urn and color to 
bet on
Ball is drawn 
from this urn
if match
if no
match
envelope =
envelope ≠
Subject receives
content of …
Figure 2: Structure of the experiment
Since we are particularly interested in the question whether ambiguity-
averse subjects continue to prefer urn H when the prize is uncertain, we
run a “within” subjects treatment, in which subjects have to make decisions
in all three situations. In order to control for order eﬀects, we run two
subtreatments. In the OS -subtreatment, subjects are first confronted with
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situation O, and then situation S. In the SO-treatment, the order is reversed.
In both treatments, subjects are asked about situation R in the end. Each
subject participates in one of the two subtreatments only. Subjects are paid
the sum of their payoﬀs from all three situations in cash at the end of the
experiment.
Paying subjects for all three decisions may be problematic if there is a
portfolio eﬀect (see e.g. Cox et al. 2011, for an extended discussion). How-
ever, the alternative of paying one randomly selected situation is not appro-
priate if subjects violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory
(Holt 1986, Karni and Safra, 1987), which is not a desirable feature if one
wants to study non-expected utility theories. To control for portfolio eﬀects,
we also conduct a “between” subjects treatment, in which each subject faces
just one of the three situations. Subjects in this treatment only face two
outcomes (win or lose) so that risk aversion does not matter for behavior.
The urn chosen as default in case that a subject indicates indiﬀerence
may also aﬀect behavior, e.g., if subjects believe this default to be infor-
mative about the urn’s composition. In order to check whether the default
aﬀects results, we systematically vary the default in treatment “between”:
About half the subjects have urn U as default, about half have urn H. In
treatment “within”, the default was urn U . Table 1 summarizes the treat-
ment characteristics.
The experiment was run as a classroom experiment with paper and pencil
in July 2010 and October 2011 using bags marked with the letters H and
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Table 1: Treatments
name description subtreatment # of subjects
“within” subjects choose in all
three situations in the
order O-S-R... OS 23
or S-O-R... SO 25
“between” subjects choose in just one
situation. Default urn
in case of indiﬀ. is H... default H 35
or U... default U 36
U that were filled with marbles. Bags were on display during the experi-
ment, so that subjects could be certain that the bags’ contents could not be
manipulated. Subjects were allowed to verify the bags’ contents after the ex-
periment and some did. The participants were 119 undergraduate economics
students from the University of Heidelberg (48 in treatment “between” and
71 in treatment “within”). They came from classes in microeconomics and
game theory, none of which had covered decision theory in general or the Ells-
berg paradox in particular. The instructions (see appendix) were distributed
on paper and were read aloud by the experimenter. The experiments lasted
between 15 and 30 min. By design, in treatment “within” earnings ranged
from 3 to 9 euro. The average payment was 6.42 euro. Since payments in
treatment “between” could only be either 1 or 3 euro, we added a show-up
fee of 3 euro such that average earnings were 4.87 euro.
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3 Theoretical predictions
A state in the experiment is described by a triplet listing the color of the
ball (b or r) drawn from the unambiguous urn H, the color of the ball (B
or R) drawn from the ambiguous urn U , and the amount in euro (3 or 1) in
envelope =.7 Thus, in total there are the eight states, S = {s1, ..., s8}, listed
in Table 2. For example, we denote state s3 by bR3 because in this state,
ball b was drawn from urn H, ball R was drawn from urn U , and the number
of euro in envelope = was 3.
Table 2: States, bets, and probabilities
S Hb Hr Ub Ur probabilities
s1 bB3 3 1 3 1 π1(p, q) = 12qp
s2 rB3 1 3 3 1 π2(p, q) = 12qp
s3 bR3 3 1 1 3 π3(p, q) = 12(1− q)p
s4 rR3 1 3 1 3 π4(p, q) = 12(1− q)p
s5 bB1 1 3 1 3 π5(p, q) = 12q(1− p)
s6 rB1 3 1 1 3 π6(p, q) = 12q(1− p)
s7 bR1 1 3 3 1 π7(p, q) = 12(1− q)(1− p)
s8 rR1 3 1 3 1 π8(p, q) = 12(1− q)(1− p)
We denote a bet (or act) on some color c in urn X by Xc. There are
four possible bets: B = {Hb,Hr, Ub, Ur}. The consequences (or payoﬀs)
associated with these bets f ∈ B are also shown in Table 2. We assume that
there is a utility function u(·) over consequences. Without loss of generality,
we set u(3) = 1 and u(1) = 0.
7The content of envelope 6= follows by implication.
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The last column of Table 1 shows the probabilities of the states as they
would be derived for a subjective expected utility maximizer who considers
• the draws from the two urns and the filling of the envelopes as inde-
pendent events, and who assumes that
• the probability of a black ball b drawn from urn H is r = 1
2
, because
the composition of urn H was announced to be half black and half red,
• the probability of a black ball B drawn from urn U is q, and
• the probability of envelope = containing 3 euro equals p.
The probability of state s, πs(p, q), then follows by the usual product rule
for independent events.
Note that the content of an envelope (3 euro or 1 euro) was either known
(in situation O), decided before the experiment started (in situation S), or
determined by a fair coin after the experiment (in situation R). Thus, in all
three situations one can reasonably assume that the envelopes’ content is
independent from the colors of the balls drawn from urns U or H. Likewise,
the colors of the balls drawn from urns H and U are independent from each
other. Whether subjects in the experiment actually consider these events to
be independent is another matter that is addressed by our experiment.
In the presence of ambiguity, the notion of “independence” is no longer
clear. Depending on how ambiguity is modeled, diﬀerent concepts of in-
dependence arise. Here, we adopt the notion of independence suggested in
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Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989, p. 150).8 Alternative ways to model ambiguity
and independence will be discussed in Section 5.
Let P be the set of priors for the probabilities that envelope = contains
3 euro and Q for the probability that B is drawn from U . Let π(p, q) :=
(π1(p, q), . . . , π8(p, q)), denote the probability distribution over states, where
πs(p, q) is the product measure for state s as defined in the last column of
Table 2.
Assumption 1 The set of priors P is the set of Gilboa-Schmeidler-independent
product measures,
P := co {π(p, q) | p ∈ P, q ∈ Q} ⊆ ∆(S).
The set of priors is thus the convex hull of all product measures that can be
constructed in the familiar way.9
We model ambiguity—averse subjects using the MEU approach by Gilboa
Schmeidler (1989). A decision maker whose preferences are described by
MEU evaluates a bet f ∈ B by
MEU(f) = min
π∈P
X
s∈S
πsu(f(s)). (1)
We assume that an MEU—maximizer has a set of priors that is compatible
with the actual compositions of the urns and the content of the envelope.
8Bade (2008) provides a discussion of alternative ways for defining independence of sets
of priors.
9Since payoﬀs in (1) are linear in probabilities, minimal payoﬀs are, of course, unaﬀected
by taking the convex hull.
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When subjects are informed of the objective probabilities of certain events,
then they are assumed to consider those events as unambiguous in the sense
of Nehring (1999). For example, if the envelope is known to contain 3 euro,
then P = {1}. Conversely, we assume that an MEU—maximizer has non—
degenerate priors in each dimension (P or Q) for which no objective proba-
bilities are known.
As a benchmark we take a subjective expected utility (SEU) maximizer
with a unique prior π who evaluates bets in the following way,
SEU(f) =
X
s∈S
πsu(f(s)).
3.1 Situation O
In situation O the content of envelope = is known; the probability that it
contains 3 euro is p = 1. When betting on urn H, there is no ambiguity and
both the SEU— and the MEU—maximizer evaluate bets equally. Using the
probabilities in Table 2 we obtain
SEU(Hb) = SEU(Hr) =MEU(Hb) =MEU(Hr) =
1
2
.
When betting on urn U , SEU—maximizers have subjective beliefs q ∈
[0, 1]. Hence, SEU(Ub) = q and SEU(Ur) = 1− q. Since
max{q, 1− q} ≥ 1
2
,
with strict inequality for q 6= 1
2
, SEU—maximizers weakly prefer betting on
urn U (denoted as U º H).
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Now, consider an MEU-maximizer. This maximizer strictly prefers urnH
to urn U if and only if the set of priors Q on urn U satisfies
Q ∩
∙
0,
1
2
¶
6= ∅ and Q ∩
µ
1
2
, 1
¸
6= ∅. (2)
In order to see this, consider the bets Ub and Ur. Bet Ub yields 3 euro in
states bB3, rB3, bR1, and rR1, while Ur yields 3 euro in four diﬀerent states
(bR3, rR3, bB1, rB1). Evaluating both bets, gives:
MEU(Ub) = min
π∈P
[π1 + π2 + π7 + π8] = min
q∈Q
q,
MEU(Ur) = min
π∈P
[π3 + π4 + π5 + π6] = min
q∈Q
(1− q).
For a strict preference to bet on urn H, both terms need to be smaller
than the value for the bets on urn H, MEU(Hb) = MEU(Hr) = 1
2
. This,
however, is the case if and only if condition (2) holds.
Prediction 1 In situation O, SEU—maximizers weakly prefer betting on urn
U . MEU—maximizers strictly prefer betting on urn H if and only if condi-
tion (2) holds.
Situation O describes the classical Ellsberg two—color urn experiment. In line
with the customary notion, we classify subjects as ambiguity-averse if they
choose to bet on urn H rather than on urn U in this situation. Theoretically,
we model these subjects as MEU—maximizers for whom condition (2) holds.
3.2 Situation S
In situation S, the content of envelope = is not known; the probability that
it contains 3 euro may be any p ∈ [0, 1]. Evaluating bet Hb for a SEU
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maximizer yields
SEU(Hb) = SEU(Hr) =
1
2
.
Let us now evaluate betHb for a decision maker with MEU preferences. This
bet wins in four states, two (bB3 and bR3) in which the color drawn from H
is black and the 3 euro are in envelope = and two (rB1 and rR1) in which
the color is red and the 3 euro are in the other envelope.
MEU(Hb) = min
π∈P
[π1 + π3 + π6 + π8]
= min
p∈P
∙
1
2
p+
1
2
(1− p)
¸
=
1
2
.
Completely analogous, MEU(Hr) = 1
2
. In other words, the probability with
which the envelope with the = sign contains 3 euro is irrelevant for evaluating
the bets on urn H, Hb and Hr.
When betting on urn U , SEU—maximizers evaluate the bets as
SEU(Ub) = qp+ (1− p)(1− q), (3)
SEU(Ur) = q(1− p) + (1− q)p.
Obviously,
max{SEU(Ub), SEU(Ur)} ≥ 1
2
for all p ∈ [0, 1], q ∈ [0, 1]
with strict inequality for all (p, q) 6= (1
2
, 1
2
). Hence, for SEU—maximizers
U º H still holds.
Next, we evaluate the bets on the urn with unknown composition for a
MEU—maximizer. For each bet, there are again four winning states and the
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MEU-maximizer assigns the following values:
MEU(Ub) = min
π∈P
[π1 + π2 + π7 + π8] (4)
= min
p∈P
q∈Q
[qp+ (1− p)(1− q)] ,
MEU(Ur) = min
π∈P
[π3 + π4 + π5 + π6]
= min
p∈P
q∈Q
[q(1− p) + (1− q)p] . (5)
Since P is non—degenerate, it holds that P 6= {1
2
}. For all p 6= 1
2
, qp + (1 −
p)(1 − q) and q(1 − p) + (1 − q)p are either strictly increasing or strictly
decreasing in q. Thus, the respective minimizers are on a boundary of Q.
Condition (2) implies that 1
2
is in the interior of Q. Evaluating the products
at q = 1
2
, we get qp+ (1− p)(1− q) = q(1− p) + (1− q)p = 1
2
. Accordingly,
the value at the minimum must be smaller,
max {MEU(Ub),MEU(Ur)} < 1
2
. (6)
Consequently, MEU—maximizers for whom condition (2) holds strictly prefer
to bet on urn H in situation S.
Prediction 2 In situation S, SEU—maximizers weakly prefer betting on urn
U . MEU—maximizers, for whom condition (2) holds, strictly prefer betting
on urn H.
According to this prediction, subjects who are classified as ambiguity-averse
because they choose H in situation O will also choose H in situation S.
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In deriving Prediction 2, we used Assumption 1, which implies the inde-
pendence between the content of the envelope and the color of the ball drawn
from urn U . In fact, a much weaker assumption suﬃces for the prediction.
Suppose a MEU—maximizer has correlated priors, e.g., he may believe that
there are more black balls in urn U whenever the envelope with the equal
sign contains 3 euro. Formally, the MEU—maximizer may consider the event
(b3 ∪ r1) as more likely than the event (b1 ∪ r3). What is suﬃcient for Pre-
diction 2 to hold is the assumption that whenever a MEU—maximizer has a
correlated prior such that prob (b3 ∪ r1) > 1
2
> prob (b1 ∪ r3), there also ex-
ists a prior in his set of priors with the inverse inequality.10 Then, betting on
black still yieldsMEU(Ub) < 1
2
. In summary, as long as the MEU—maximizer
is not absolutely certain about the sign of the correlation, he strictly prefers
to bet on urn H.
3.3 Situation R
In situation R, the content of envelope = is determined by a fair coin and
hence P =
©
1
2
ª
. Evaluating (3) and (4) at p = 1
2
, it is easy to see that
SEU(Ub) = SEU(Ur) =MEU(Ub) =MEU(Ur) =
1
2
,
SEU(Hb) = SEU(Hr) =MEU(Hb) =MEU(Hr) =
1
2
.
Hence both SEU— and MEU—maximizers are indiﬀerent between all four bets.
Prediction 3 In situation R, SEU—maximizers and ambiguity—averse indi-
10Note that this condition is automatically satisfied if Assumption 1 and condition (2)
hold.
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viduals are indiﬀerent between betting on either urn.
We can summarize all three predictions in Table 3.
Table 3: Summary of theoretical predictions
SEU MEU
Situation O U % H H Â U
Situation S U % H H Â U
Situation R U ∼ H U ∼ H
4 Experimental results
Before coming to our main results, the comparison between behavior when
envelopes are sealed and open, we address three preliminary concerns: order,
portfolio, and default eﬀects.
We test for order eﬀects by using a variation in our “within”treatment.
In sub-treatment SO, subjects were first presented to situation S, while in
sub-treatment OS, they first were confronted with situation O. Table 8 in the
appendix lists the frequency of urn choices in situation O and S for the two
sub-treatments. A χ2—test shows that the frequencies are not significantly
diﬀerent (p-value 0.51). Accordingly, we pool both sub-treatments in our
following analysis. In order to see whether the default aﬀects behavior, we
use the variation in the default urn in the “between”treatment. The percent-
age of subjects choosing urn H was 48.6% when the default was H versus
55.6% when the default was U. A χ2—test shows that the frequencies are not
significantly diﬀerent (p-value: 0.28). Portfolio eﬀects can be assessed by
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comparing urn choice distributions in the “within” and “between” treatment
(see Table 4). We find no indication for such eﬀects at any conventional level
(p-value of χ2—test: 0.60).
Table 4: Percentage of subjects choosing the urns in the diﬀerent situations
urn choices in %
urn H urn U indiﬀerent
Situation O 62.5 22.9 14.6
treatment “within” Situation S 39.6 35.4 25.0
Situation R 52.1 25.0 22.9
Situation O 62.5 33.3 4.2
treatment “between” Situation S 45.5 45.5 9.1
Situation R 48.0 36.0 16.0
Note: A total of 48 subjects made urn choices for all three situations of treatment
“within”; 71 subjects made choices in one of the situations of treatment “between”.
4.1 Main results
Table 4 shows the percentage of subjects who chose the various urns in the
three diﬀerent situations. When the content of the envelope is known (situ-
ation O), we get the standard result that almost 2/3 of subjects prefer the
unambiguous urn H. In fact, in both treatments, exactly 62.5% of subjects
prefer urn H.
Most interestingly, when the content of the envelope is also ambiguous,
we get the lowest number of subjects choosing urn H. In situation S, about
as many subjects prefer urn H as prefer urn U, with the remaining explicitly
stating that they are indiﬀerent. The majority no longer seems to strictly
prefer urn H in situation S.
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Table 5: Probit regression: probability of choosing H in Situations O
marg. eﬀect std. error p-value pseudo R2 = .06
situation S −.225∗∗∗ .079 .006 n = 212
situation R −.095 .077 .219 logL = −138.69
first situation .098 .086 .259
H is default .039 .112 .726
between −.067 .116 .563
female .207∗∗ .086 .018
Note: Standard errors are clustered by individuals in treatment “within” and by sessions
in treatment “between”. A constant term is included. ∗∗∗(∗∗) significant at the 1% or 5%
level, respectively. Three subjects are not included in the regression because their gender
information were missing
Table 5 presents the result of a probit regression where the probability
of choosing urn H is explained by six dummy variables: two dummies for
the situation, with situation O being the default, a dummy that indicates
whether the observation stems from the first choice by an individual,11 a
dummy for the default urn being H in case of indiﬀerence, a dummy for
treatment “between”, and a dummy for the subject being female. Reported
are percentage changes for an average participant when the respective char-
acteristic is changed.12 Standard errors are clustered on the individual level
in treatment “within” and on the session level in treatment “between”. The
probability of choosing urn H is reduced by almost 22% in situation S versus
situation O and this diﬀerence is highly significant. Females are more than
11This dummy measures any general tendency to change behavior from the first to the
second choice. It is thus related but diﬀerent from the order eﬀect. The latter cannot
simply be assessed with a dummy in this regression because the value of this dummy for
subjects in the treatment “between” would be missing (as they only face one situation).
12These estimates of the marginal eﬀects for the average participant are very similar to
the average marginal eﬀects.
21
20% more likely to choose urn H, a diﬀerence which is significant at the 5%
level. All other dummies are not significant. In particular, the regression
confirms that there are no default or portfolio eﬀects.
In order to analyze the choice behavior in more detail, Table 6 shows a
cross tabulation of choices in situation O versus choices in situation S of all
subjects that have decided in both situations (i.e. in treatment “within”).
From the 30 subjects that choose urn H in situation O, only 14 stick to this
choice in situation S. On the other hand, 13 of the 18 subjects that choose
an urn diﬀerent from H in situation O continue to pick an urn diﬀerent
from H in situation S. These diﬀerences are significant according to an exact
McNemar test (p = 0.026, two—sided). Let us summarize these findings.
Result 1 Significantly fewer subjects have a strict preference for urn H in
situation S than in situation O.
This result stands in contrast with Prediction 2, according to which subjects
who prefer H in situation O should also do so in situation S.
Table 6: Number of subjects choosing the urns in situations O versus S in
treatment “within”
urn choice in situation O
urn H urn U indiﬀ Total
urn H 14 5 0 19
urn choices urn U 11 4 2 17
in situation S indiﬀ 5 2 5 12
Total 30 11 7 48
Table 7 shows the respective cross tabulation of urn choices in situation O
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versus choices in situation R. Of the 30 subjects who prefer H in situation O,
21 continue to prefer H in situation R, while 14 of the 18 subjects who did
not prefer H, continue not to prefer H. The inflows and outflows of the two
groups are not significantly diﬀerent according to an exact McNemar test
(p = 0.27).
Table 7: Number of subjects choosing the urns in situations O vs. R in
treatment “within”
urn choice in situation O
urn H urn U indiﬀ Total
urn H 21 4 0 25
urn choices urn U 4 7 1 12
in situation R indiﬀ 5 0 6 11
Total 30 11 7 48
Note in particular the small number of subjects who claim to be indiﬀerent
in situation R, where according to the theory a coin flip should make all
subjects indiﬀerent. Yet only 11 of the 48 subjects indicate that they are
indiﬀerent. Of the 30 subjects who expressed a preference for urn H in
situation O, only 5 are made indiﬀerent by the coin flip in situation R. If we
consider all subjects (as in Table 4), only 20.5% of subjects are indiﬀerent in
situation R. This confirms (albeit weakly) earlier findings by Dominiak and
Schnedler (2011) that ambiguity-averse subjects do not view randomization
devices as means to overcome ambiguity.
Result 2 The preferences for H in situations O and R are not significantly
diﬀerent. The coin flip in situation R makes only a few subjects indiﬀerent
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between the two urns.
5 Alternative models of ambiguity
In this paper, we have focused on the MEU approach to model ambiguity.
Two prominent alternatives are Choquet expected utility (CEU) with convex
capacities pioneered by Schmeidler (1989) and the smooth ambiguity model
by Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005).
Klibanoﬀ, Marinacci, and Mukerji (2005) assume a two-stage representa-
tion where a decision maker with ambiguity in terms of multiple priors over
states has beliefs represented by a probability distribution over these priors.
The support of the probability distribution over priors describes the set of
priors about states. It is not diﬃcult to see that the independence notion of
Assumption 1 carries over in a natural way. Maintaining Assumption 1, how-
ever, one will obtain the same predictions as in Table 3. To the best of our
knowledge, there exists no thorough investigation of notions of independence
for the smooth model. Hence, it must remain an open question, whether
one can obtain sensible concepts of independence that would support the
behavior observed in our experiment.
Interestingly, for the CEU approach of Schmeidler (1989) predictions are
not necessarily the same. Independence in this setting could be represented in
various ways as product capacities (see Hendon, Jacobsen, Sloth, and Tranæs,
1996). A particular well-known case is the Möbius product (for details see,
e.g., Denneberg 1997). However, there is no product capacity that yields
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results equivalent to assuming Gilboa-Schmeidler-product-independence in
the MEU approach as shown by Chateauneuf and Lefort (2008) building
on Ghirardato’s work (1997) on the independence of capacities.13 While
there are no obvious alternative concepts of independence for MEU, it is not
diﬃcult to find some product capacity for which the CEU representation can
accommodate the behavior observed in our experiment.
6 Discussion
Our experiment examined the eﬀect of introducing additional ambiguity
to the standard two-color Ellsberg experiment. Subjects were classified as
ambiguity-averse according to their behavior in a standard Ellsberg experi-
ment. We found that many of these subjects no longer preferred betting on
the urn with known probabilities if they did not know the prizes they could
win (situation S in our experiment). In other words, fewer subjects preferred
to bet on events with known proportions once a second source of ambiguity
was in place.
The observed behavior contrasts with the predictions of various theories
(MEU, smooth ambiguity) for a decision maker who regards the two sources
of ambiguity as independent (in the sense of Assumption 1). In order to
describe the observed behavior with these theories, we would have to impose
some form of dependence. For example, a decision maker who has chosen to
bet on urn H and the color black, could believe with certainty that given a
13See also Nehring (1999) who shows that this is true even if one of the marginal capac-
ities is additive.
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black ball is drawn, the envelope = contains 1 euro, whereas given a red ball
is drawn, he is certain that the very same envelope contains 3 euro. More
generally, the decision maker must believe that the probability describing the
contents of the envelopes changes depending on the color of the ball drawn.
Alternatively, our findings can be accommodated by representing prefer-
ences diﬀerently, for example, by using Schmeidler’s CEU approach (1989).
In any case, our paper highlights the importance of suitable definitions
of independence for ambiguity models which so far may have been not fully
appreciated.
References
[1] Anscombe, F. J., and R. J. Aumann (1963), “A Definition of Subjective
Probability,” Annals of Mathematical Statistics, 34, 199—205.
[2] Bade, S. (2008), “Stochastic Independence with Maxmin Expected Util-
ities”, mimeo, Penn State University.
[3] Camerer, C. (1995), “Individual decision making“ in Handbook of Exper-
imental Economics, ed. by A. Roth and J. Kagel, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, vol. 2.
[4] Chateauneuf, A. and J-Ph. Lefort (2008), “Some Fubini Theorems on
product σ-algebras for non-additive measures”, International Journal of
Approximate Reasoning 48, 686-696.
26
[5] Cohen, M., Gilboa, I., Jaﬀray, J. and Schmeidler, D. (2000), “An exper-
imental study of updating ambiguous beliefs Risk”, Decision and Policy
5, 123-133.
[6] Cox, J.C., V. Sadiraj, and U. Schmidt (2011), “Paradoxes and Mecha-
nisms for Choice under Risk”, Kiel Working Paper No. 1712, University
of Kiel.
[7] Denneberg, D. (1997), “Representation of the Choquet integral with the
r-additive Möbius transform”, Fuzzy Sets and Systems 92, 139-156.
[8] Dominiak, A., P. Duersch, and J.-Ph. Lefort (2012), “A Dynamic Ells-
berg Urn Experiment”, forthcoming Games and Economic Behavior.
[9] Dominiak A. and W. Schnedler (2011), “Uncertainty aversion and Pref-
erences for Randomization: An Experimental Study,” Economic Theory
48 (2), 289-312.
[10] Eichberger, J., S. Grant, and D. Kelsey (2007), “Updating Choquet
Beliefs,” Journal of Mathematical Economics, 43, 888—899.
[11] Eichberger, J., and D. Kelsey (1996a), “Uncertainty Aversion and Dy-
namic Consistency,” International Economic Review, 37, 625—640.
[12] Eichberger, J., and D. Kelsey (1996b), “Uncertainty Aversion and Pref-
erence for Randomization,” Journal of Economic Theory, 71, 31—43.
[13] Eliaz K. and P. Ortoleva (2011), “A Variation on Ellsberg”, mimeo,
Brown University.
27
[14] Ellsberg, D. (1961), “Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms”, Quar-
terly Journal of Economics, 75, 643-669.
[15] Epstein, L. G., and M. Schneider (2003), “Recursive Multiple-Priors,”
Journal of Economic Theory, 113, 1—31.
[16] Ghirardato, P. (1997), “On Independence for non-additive measures,
with a Fubini theorem,” Journal of Economic Theory 73, 261—291.
[17] Gilboa, I. and D. Schmeidler (1989), “Maxmin expected utility with
non-unique prior”, Journal of Mathematical Economics, 18, 141-153.
[18] Gneezy, U. (2005), “Deception: the role of consequences“, American
Economic Review, 95(1), 384—394.
[19] Halevy, Y. (2007), “Ellsberg Revisited: An Experimental Study”,
Econometrica, 75, 503-536.
[20] Hansen, L. P., T. J. Sargent, G. A. Turmuhambetova, and N. Williams
(2006), “Robust Control and Model Misspecification,” Journal of Eco-
nomic Theory, 128, 45—90.
[21] Hendon, E., Jacobsen, H.J., Sloth, B., and T. Tranæs (1996), “The
Product of Capacities and Belief Functions,” Mathematical Social Sci-
ences, 32, 95—108.
[22] Holt, C. A. (1986), “Preference Reversals and the Independence Axiom”,
American Economic Review, 76, 508-515.
28
[23] Hurkens, S. and N. Kartik (2009), “Would I lie to you? On social
preferences and lying aversion”, Experimental Economics, 12, 180—192.
[24] Karni, E., and Z. Safra, (1987), “Preference Reversal and the Observabil-
ity of Preferences by Experimental Models ”, Econometrica, 55, 675-685.
[25] Klibanoﬀ, P., M. Marinacci, and S. Mukerji (2005), “A smooth model
of decision making under ambiguity”, Econometrica, 73, 1849-1892.
[26] Klibanoﬀ, P. (2001), “Stochastically Independent Randomization and
Uncertainty Aversion,” Economic Theory, 18, 605—620.
[27] Nehring, K. (1999), “Capacities and Probabilistic Beliefs: A Precarious
Coexistence,” Mathematical Social Sciences 38, 197-213.
[28] Raiﬀa, H. (1961), “Risk, Ambiguitry and the Savage Axioms: A Com-
ment,” Quarterly Journal of Economics, 75, 690—694.
[29] Sarin, R. K., and P. P. Wakker (1998), “Dynamic Choice and Nonex-
pected Utility,” Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, 17, 87—119.
[30] Schmeidler, D. (1989), “Subjective probability and expected utility with-
out additivity,” Econometrica, 57, 571-587.
[31] Spears, D. (2009), “Preference for Randomization?: Anscombe-Aumann
Inconsistency in the Lab,” mimeo, Princeton University.
[32] Vanberg, C. (2008), “Why do people keep their promises? An experi-
mental test of two explanations,” Econometrica, 76, 1467-1480.
29
Appendix
Table 8: Urns choices in treatments SO and OS
Urn choice
HH HN NH NN Total
subtreatment SO 8 7 4 6 25
subtreatment OS 6 9 1 7 23
Total 14 16 5 13 48
The first letter indicates the urn choice in situation O, the second in situation S.
“H ”denotes a preference for urn H, while “N ” denotes no preference for urn H.
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Instructions14
Welcome to our experiment. Please read these instructions carefully. Turn oﬀ
your mobile phone, don’t talk to your neighbors, and remain quiet throughout
the experiment. If you have any questions, please raise your hand, and
someone will come to you.
In this experiment you’ll make a number of decisions. Make your decisions
carefully since you can earn some money, which will be paid in cash at the
end of the experiment. The decisions you are supposed to make diﬀer for all
participants somewhat. So, copying from your neighbor(s) makes no sense.
The experimenter has two bags on his table, with each bag containing 40
marbles. Each marble is either blue or green. In Bag H half of the marbles
are green, and the other half are blue. For Bag U you do not know how
many marbles are blue and how many are green. That is, any combination
is possible for bag U, from 0 blue marbles (that is, 40 green marbles) to 40
blue marbles (that is, 0 green marbles). After completion of the experiment,
you are invited to check the content of bag H and bag U.
In total, we have three situations, each of them is associated with two
envelopes containing money. In each situation one of the two envelopes con-
tains 1 euro and the other 3 euros. It depends on the situation which of the
two envelopes contains 3 euros.
In each of the three situations you specify
14These are the instructions for treatment “within”. The instructions for treatment
“between” are modified in an obvious way such that subjects only have to make one
choice in one of the situations.
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• the bag (U or H ) from which to draw a marble
• the color (blue or green) of the marble
If the marble being drawn has the color you specified, you will get the
amount contained in the envelope labeled =. If the marble being drawn has
not the color you specified, you will get the amount contained in the envelope
labeled 6=.
If you do not care from which bag the ball is drawn or for a particu-
lar color, please indicate so. Since it does not matter for you, we will for
simplicity take the first bag or first color, respectively.
The marbles will be drawn at the end of the experiment by one of the
participants you picked. After each drawing, the marble is put back into the
bag.
Situation 1
With a probability unknown to you, it was determined whether the = enve-
lope or the 6= envelope contains 3 euros. That is, you do not know whether
the = envelope or the 6= envelope contains 3 euros.
¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag U
¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag H
¤ I don’t care which bag is selected
I specify the following color: ¤ blue ¤ green ¤ I don’t care
Situation 2
The = envelope contains 3 euros and the 6= envelope contains 1 euro.
¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag U
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¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag H
¤ I don’t care which bag is selected
I specify the following color: ¤ blue ¤ green ¤ I don’t care
Situation 3
At the end of the experiment a participant will toss a fair coin. If heads
wins, 3 euros are put in the = envelope, and 1 euro in the 6= envelope. If
tails wins, the money is allocated vice versa.
¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag U
¤ I want the marble to be drawn from bag H
¤ I don’t care which bag is selected
I specify the following color: ¤ blue ¤ green ¤ I don’t care
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